Vortrag über Ungarn 1809 am Consortium on the Revolutionary Era


The political and military situation in the Kingdom of Hungary in the year 1809

Kaiser Franz of Austria was also King of Hungary. Unlike his father Leopold, he was a “narrow, dry, closed man, in no way especially gifted, whose political accomplishment in those turbulent years consisted principally in surviving.” (1) The work of the secret police expanded considerably under his rule and was extended into Hungary as well. The Kingdom of Hungary in 1809 had some 12.9 million inhabitants or 11.3 million if Croatia is excluded, comprised of Hungarians, Rumanians, Germans, and Croats, of whom approximately one-third were Hungarians, additionally 80,000 Jews and 10,000 Roma or “Gypsies.” The diverse customs of these ethnic groups guaranteed Hungary’s intellectual and cultural development. The highest state institution was the Reichstag or Imperial Diet, composed of two houses: the Magnates and the Estates. The House of Magnates was the upper body, while elected representatives sat in the lower house as deputies of the nobility in 52 counties and 53 royal free–cities. (2)
The nobility was divided between the ordinary nobility and the magnates. Nobles with free possessions (minor nobility and royal free–cities) and nobles with privileges, to which the clergy and the secular high nobility belonged. Many areas of political life were guided from Vienna, such as the high justice authority in the Privy Council, the revenue office of the Privy Chamber, tax collection in the Court Chancellery, and the direction of military affairs in the Court War Council (Hofkriegsrat). Hungary’s intelligentsia was strongly Austria–oriented. Most students studied in Vienna or Graz, even in Rome or Paris. Modern Hungarian historians estimate the number of those studying in foreign universities at 15 to 20,000. Living predominantly in Vienna, the nobility had little interest in the Hungarian language and even opposed the introduction of Hungarian as the national language (as during the Imperial Diet sessions of 1790 to 1792). It is interesting, for example, that the language heard in Hungary’s capital, Pressburg, was almost exclusively German. It was thus a curiosity that a Hungarian artisan would not have been able to make himself understood in his own capital. Similarly, the inhabitants of cities and towns, unlike the rural population, were largely of German origin.
In 1796, Archduke Joseph was elected as the “Palatine,” or viceroy, of Hungary. He lived in the palace in Buda, which was also the home of the state administration whose chief he was. The state administration transmitted rules and regulations to the various counties (Komitate). The cities of Buda and Pest experienced a considerable upswing or boom owing to Joseph’s presence. Barely 20 years old, he was filled with youthful enthusiasm, holding in his memory his father Leopold’s advice that he always intervene specially on behalf of the population and its wellbeing and that he adhere strictly to the laws of the land. To the surprise of the Habsburg ruling house, he quickly succeeded in winning the trust of the people. “His nighttime visits to Pest were well–known during carnival season, often dressed in Hungarian traditional costume. He loved the dance events at the Inn of the Seven Princes and sometimes stayed until three in the morning.”
(3)
With this as political background, we can regard the French invasion of 1809 as a reflection of Hungary’s turbulent history as well as a trauma for the population. The patriotism and unity generated by the invasion remains intact today. Evidence of the determination shown by the Hungarians can be found in the memoirs of a contemporary Hungarian officer commenting on the reaction to the entry of Baden troops into Hungary: “It is noteworthy that everywhere that the enemy came into a village in Hungary, the local people—men, women, and children—gathered together in a group and waited, staring them in the eye boldly and forcefully. This surprised the French a great deal at first. They remarked upon this often. In Germany and everywhere else that they had been, they said, the local people had hidden themselves, here, however, the daring populace was not to be trusted.” (4)
Owing to Austria’s war preparations during 1808, the Imperial Diet decided on 28 August to call up the Insurrection. They were to be assembled in the cities of Raab, Keszthely, Neutra, Komorn, Kassa and Debrecen. While Hungarian troops served in the Austrian standing army under Kaiser Franz and the Court War Council, the Insurrection was raised when “in open war the regular army is not capable of holding back the enemy and an immanent invasion of the empire threatens.” (5) “On the other hand, Article 21 of the 1715 law clearly stated that units of the personal, banner, and portal Insurrection would thereafter be organized separately under the overall command of the Palatine, led by him or by a commander under him and named with his consent, that it cannot stand directly at the disposal of the Imperial Court War Council. The relevant order from Vienna on 23 April 1809 and the Palatine Archduke Joseph forwarded it to the counties on the 27th.” (6) Article 12 of the 1791 law stated “Executive power must be exercised in Hungary in accord with the laws; the king and his estates hold legislative authority in common; wherefore Hungary may never be ruled through edicts or patents.” (7) Key for the Insurrection was that by law it was only permitted to fulfill purely defensive roles and could only be activated when the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary and therefore the Hungarian population were threatened.
“In March 1809, the Palatine visited the trans-Danubian counties to encourage the nobility to battle and to swear them to the defense of the thousand–year constitution and the Hungarian Kingdom. This proved effective as the nobility received the king’s representative with great
enthusiasm. For the nobility in the counties, the defense of their constitutional freedom meant also the maintenance of their noble privileges. The language of command within the Noble Insurrection became Hungarian. From the spring of 1809, the county administrations received special tasks owing to the Austrian preparations for war. The nobility in general had to be organized, individual nobles had to be registered, and those suitable to military service had to be selected, trained and equipped. As far as the cavalry was concerned, the county officials fulfilled these tasks relatively quickly. But the infantry battalions could only be raised with difficulty, as the nobility did not even want to serve in the infantry as officers. The nobles bore the associated costs themselves, though in some cases these were covered by the counties or the treasury. A sense of patriotic sacrifice also advanced the careers of those who participated in the Noble Insurrection’s administration and medical services. The events of 1809 contributed to enhanced social prestige and respect for the participants. Their efforts, however, were not recognized by the following, more liberal generation, as it was pressing for bourgeois revolution. With Lajos Kossuth in the lead, the veterans of 1809 came under attack as representatives of the old order and thus as enemies.”
(8)
When Kaiser Franz decided on war with Napoleon, he needed the assistance of the entire monarchy and, in the “hour of danger,” he called upon “the people of Austria.” “Rise, therefore, people of Austria! Protect your fatherland, your monarch, your possessions and, above all, your great union of peoples. In this is your strength, your happiness. The Hungarian, the Austrian, the Bohemian, the Galician, all are made strong in that all stand for one. Alone the different hereditary lands would be too weak to withstand the powerful oppressor. This union of states can only be held together by victories. If Napoleon wins, he will tear up this union and divide the state among his minions to oppress all and to rob everyone of his private possessions.” (9)
Here Franz erred, as Napoleon’s proclamation to the Hungarian people showed, in which he promised separation from the Austrian imperial house. This proclamation was published in Vienna on 15 May and displayed in public places in Hungary. “It is the Emperor of Austria who has declared war against me, not the King of Hungary. According to your constitution, he could only do this with your concurrence; your policy, which has always been only defensive, and the measures that you took during the most recent session of your Imperial Diet, have shown me well enough that your wish was for the maintenance of peace. Hungarians! The moment has come for you to receive your independence. I offer you peace, the unalterable retention of your territories, your freedom and your constitutions; you may retain them as they are or modify them yourselves if you so desire according to the spirit of the times or the interests of your compatriots. I demand nothing of you. I only want to see you as a free and independent nation. Further: give yourselves a king who only has your election to thank for his crown.” The concluding sentence stated: “Assemble yourselves in a National Diet and let me know your decision.” (10) In Vienna, Napoleon expressed his thoughts regarding Hungary: “The Hungarians have no fear of me, because they have a ruler who makes demands of them at every session of the parliament, but never accepts their legitimate complaints.” (11) Napoleon expected a division between the feudal nobles and the liberal bourgeoisie, but the nobility were not interested in his ideas and the liberals had no personality who could assume a leadership role. There were individuals, such as the historian Istvan Horvath, who wanted change, but who only supported restraint among people with the same interest. One opponent told Camille Tournon, the French resident in Bayreuth, that: “It is true that in the fall of 1809 as desired peace approached and the external threat diminished, the nobility began to wish that Austria not remain too strong. God should grant that our king should lose Vienna and thus be required to remove his residence to Buda.” Tournon replied, “The nobility seemed to see in the weakening of the Austrian house some sort of guarantee that their constitution, their one and true idol, should remain intact.” (12)
Never before had Napoleon offered such concessions. How far he could be trusted was uncertain. The “proclamation” had no effect and, as Hungarians loyal to the House of Habsburg immediately removed the proclamations, it remained largely unknown. It was generally expected that Napoleon would advance on Buda and Pest after the Battle of Raab (14 June). The administration fled to Kassa (German Kaschau); even the captive French emissary Charles Dodun was taken to Kassa. Many fled to the most southeastern borders of Hungary. “After the Battle of Raab, people were in great fear. Not just the administration, but the commander in Hungary, Field Marshal Alvinzcy, left Buda, even Pest, and moved towards Theiss.” (13) But Napoleon’s troops remained near Uj–Szöny, also known as Komorn. An order from the emperor to Eugene de Beauharnais, the local French commander, stated: “If the archduke flees, pursue him so that he cannot cross the Danube at Komorn. As far as I know there is no bridge at Komorn, therefore he must flee to Buda. Pursue him without going too far from me. You must hinder the crossing at Komorn, so that the enemy will have to retreat to Buda, they will thus distance themselves from Vienna.” (14)
Recruiting for the Insurrection began following the Palatine’s order of 27 April 1809. Large landholders made available large contingents of their workers and wanted themselves to assume military leadership roles even though they possessed none of the requisite skills or background. Any noble who did not wish to serve personally could pay a substitute to serve in his place. The military depots were opened, but were found to contain only antiquated or unserviceable material. “With the exception of the mounted nobles, they [the Insurrection] were inadequately equipped and poorly armed, especially the infantry. Many even carried pikes, scythes, axes or “buzogany” (a form of morning star).” (15) Most of the pistols could not fire. While resting in Nemesdömölk with several other officers, the Italian War Minister, General Caffarelli, told retired Major Mayer: “They are courageous, but untrained and poorly armed. They can do nothing about this. After only a few days or weeks of training, the unfortunate Insurrection troops were sent against veterans while armed only with hatchets and unserviceable pistols.” (16) Most of the muskets dated from 1748 and 1754. Twelve cannon were available. “The horses had never experienced the noise of battle, so they became nervous and were hardly to be controlled. Many riders dismounted and led their horses out of the battle line by hand”. (17) The Insurrection was not accustomed to the words of command. The few Austrian officers only spoke German and were hardly understood. The monarchy now paid for the nonchalance of Kaiser Franz and Archduke Charles (President of the Court War Council), who had ignored the Palatine’s repeated requests for professional trainers and modern weapons. Although the Palatine Joseph counted on 35,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, in the end only 11,108 infantry and 8,839 cavalry saw action. The Palatine himself served as supreme commander. “Archduke John, an inexperienced army commander barely 27 years old who was unnecessarily retreating from Italy with the Army of Inner Austria, received an order on 24 May in Graz to ‘move to Pressburg via Raab and the Schütt Island with all troops under command’ in order to join with the Main Army from there [Pressburg].” (18) He was pursued by Viceroy Eugene de Beauharnais, commander of the [French] Army of Italy, who was the same age as John, but more experienced. Describing Archduke John’s army, Archduke Joseph wrote in his diary: “Cavalry very weak, the dragoons and lancers (19a) are especially weak and their appearance is also poor. My regiment [the Archduke Joseph Hussars] is in fairly good condition and relatively strong. The Ott Hussars are also strong, but their appearance is not so good. The infantry is weak and tattered with the exception of theEsterhazy and Alvinczy Regiments and the grenadiers; there are also many recruits in the ranks. The Landwehr battalions offer a wretched appearance, the soldiers are not trained, have never stood up to the enemy.” (19) On 12 June, John and Joseph met in Tet to discuss future plans in the coming battle with Eugene. “Joseph asked: ‘What will you do?’ John replied: ‘Meet the enemy on the field at Raab!’ Joseph: ‘With what? With this ruined army? I will not fight. Let us go back to Komorn, there your soldiers may rest and I can train the Insurrection. John showed an order from the Kaiser directing that he [John] would be commander of the combined Habsburg forces. Joseph answered: ‘Do what you will!’ He then climbed into his carriage and shouted to the driver: ‘To Raab!’” (20)
“Immediately after arrival in Raab, it was decided to distribute the Insurrection troops [throughout the rest of the army] so that the untrained would gain instruction and support from the regulars.” (21)
After their dispute, the both commanders agreed to make their decisions in common. But John ignored this compromise the very next day. Palatine Joseph received a letter from Kaiser Franz directing him to return to Austria. He was to turn over command of the Insurrection to Archduke John. This was contrary to the Hungarian laws. Joseph declined to depart, an unprecedented affront to the Kaiser and a disobedience of orders that left the imperial court speechless. The incapacity of Archduke John and his staff was evident in many instances. John wanted to take the offensive on 15 June, but Eugene opened the battle on the 14th. This battle of Raab was an unusual situation as the Austrians had developed neither a plan for attack or defense. John’s arrogance and the failure of the intelligence service opened an excellent opportunity for Eugene to defeat 35,000 men of the united regular/Insurrection army. At first thinking there were only 12,000 to 15,000 French, it was soon evident that 40,000 were forming themselves for battle. The Insurrection, indiscriminately distributed among the regular troops, was completely overtaxed. General Mecséry, commander of the Hungarian cavalry and an outstanding tactician, at first succeeded in drawing the French cavalry out to the east, but the French soon recognized the danger of splitting their forces, turned about and advanced on the Hungarians. A detailed analysis of the events surrounding the battle demonstrates that Palatine Joseph was correct in his recommendation at Tet: namely, that the combined armies retreat on Komorn. As it was, the battle could only end in disaster. Here I would also like to mention that Archduke John spread several falsehoods about the battle and officially documented them in his account for Kaiser Franz. Here is a case where study of the official documents and literature veils the truth and can lead to incorrect interpretations. Unrest and demonstrations against the imperial house in Vienna created fears that further defeats could mean an end to Kaiser Franz’s rule and led some to conclude that scapegoats were needed to divert attention from Habsburg failures. The Hungarian Insurrection was the perfect institution to blame for the defeat at Raab. It is hardly surprising that Archduke Charles and Archduke John later fell into disfavor while Palatine Joseph was remembered as a celebrated advocate of Hungary’s interests until 1847. The criticism that the Insurrection fled in droves is also misleading. Free citizens who had reported for military duty were permitted to leave the battlefield, return home and turn in their weapons after combat. The counties promised five-days pay if they declared themselves willing to commit to longer service. “Owing to their lack of military experience, they were told they would not be arrested. If they could convince a comrade to sign up, they were promised favorable treatment. The registration of new troops could not begin until 5 July as many French were still present in the countryside.” (22) Only those who left their regiments during the battle counted as deserters and were later held responsible for their actions. The 4,500 Insurrection troops who arrived back in Buda [for example] included those who had departed late and never reached the battle, but turned back on encountering soldiers in flight. In the beginning of August, Kaiser Franz moved into the Esterhazy Palace in Tata and remained there until the signing of the peace treaty in October.
He then returned to Vienna. Napoleon visited Raab unexpectedly on 31 August to review work on the town’s fortifications.
(23) As for the Insurrection troops, “a royal order of 2 November dissolved the noble cavalry, but the infantry remained in its quarters. The foot soldiers did not return home until 12 January 1810.” (24)

Literature and Notes

1 Lendvai Paul,
Die Ungarn. Eine tausendjährige Geschichte, Munich 2001, p. 221, 222.
(The french historian Georges Lefebvre called Kaiser Franz a „solemnly nought“. Already during his childhood in
Toskany a nanny said, that he is not the smartest. A lack of self-confidence was the reason, that he must control
everything and everybody. Even his wife Ludovica. In the „Secret digits cabinet“ in the Stallburg in Vienna, letters were
opened during the night with all the technique of chemistry, before they were allowed to pass the next
morning. „Night reports“ and „Weekly reports“ have to be on his table already early in the morning. He was interested
in everythig, even in the most banale things.)
2 (The Reichstag from 1792 to 1808 contains: see I. A. Fessler,
Die Geschichten der Ungern und ihrer Landsassen, part 10, book 24, Leipzig 1825.)
1792 had the upper body a total of 207 Prelates and Magnates, the lower house 352 representatives of the scores. (Page 659)
1796 had the upper body a total of 25 Prelates and 177 Magnates, the lower house 20 representatives from the royal high
court, 30 of the cities and 335 of the scores. (Page 672)
1802 had the upper body a total of 25 Prelates and 203 Magnates, the lower house 434 representatives of the scores.
(Page 690 and 693)
1805 had the upper body a total of 20 Prelates and 118 Magnates, the lower house 481 representatives of the scores. (Page 700)
1807 had the upper body a total of 24 Prelates and 186 Magnates, the lower house 16 representatives from the royal high
court, 31 clergies and 402 representatives of the scores. (Page 702)
The Reichstag from 1808 contains: in the upper body 30 Prelates and 241 Magnates, in the lower house 421 representatives
of the scores. (Page 712 and 713).
János Poór:
Adók, katonák, orsz.ggyl.sek, Budapest, 2003, says:
1802: upper body 228, lower house 450.
1805: upper body 138, lower house 417.
1807: upper body 211, lower house 448. The reason of this slightly difference compared to I. A. Fessler are in multiple
answers (= multiple payments).
3 Eble Gabriel,
Palatin Erzherzog Joseph und Erzherzog Karl in Pest, Budapest 1911, p. 12-13.
4 Wöber Ferdi Irmfried,
1809 Die Napoleonische Epoche in Ungarn,Vienna, Maria Anzbach 2008, p. 5, cit. from Sándor
Domanovszky,
Magyarország újabbkori történetének forrásai, Budapest 1935, p. 99.
5 Zachar József, Scriptum for his lecture in german language
Die Insurrektion des Königreichs Ungarn, at the
symposium „Napoleon und Graz“, June 2004 in Graz.
(The regular hungarian army contents of 15 infantry regiments, 12 hussar regiments and 17 border regiments.)
6 (In the year 1222 we find the first written work „generalis exercitus“, in which the mobilization of all nobilities were
set. This was the beginning of the noble Insurrection. 100 years later it was set that the nobles, after their honour
position and their possessions, Banderials either under their own or together under the Banner of the counties committed
to service. This was the banderial Insurrection. 1397 the Reichstag decided, that the nobility per 100 manors must
establish five mounted light archers. This was the beginning of the military position after the gates of the serfs (porta),
the portal Insurrection. The personal Insurrection stand under the Sovereignty of the Holy Crown and included the high
clergy, who not needed to serve in the military. This case of special position made it possible for them to nominate a deputy.
To the royal free-cities belonged abbeys, cathedrals and monastic orders. These classifications remained until 1848.)
See József Zachar, lecture in german language
Die Insurrektion des Königreichs Ungarn, Ein historischer Überblick, at
the Napoleon Symposium „Feldzug 1809“ from 4 and 5 June 2009 in Vienna, in
Zusammenfassung der Beiträge, p. 93.)
7 Fessler I. A.,
Die Geschichten der Ungern und ihrer Landsassen, part 10, book 24, Leipzig 1825, p. 729.
8 Hudi József, Scriptum for his lecture in hungarian language
Közigazgatás és országvédelem 1809-ben, for the
„Napoleon Symposium“ from 11 June 2005 in Pápa.
9 Liebel Ignaz,
Aufruf an Österreichs Völker, Vienna 1809, p. 27 and 28.
10 Wöber Ferdi Irmfried,
1809 Die Napoleonische Epoche in Ungarn, Vienna, Maria Anzbach 2008, p. 44.
11 Domokos Kosáry,
Napoléon és Magyarország, Budapest 1977, p. 122.
(Napoleon had foreseen Prince Nikolaus Esterházy as the new king. He only should immediately abandon all military
activities against the French. Esterházy did not show any interest.)
The politician Pál Nagy was especially critical of Habsburg imperial policy. This earned him a rebuke from the king, but
the advocates of Hungarian nationalism celebrated him. He only changed his opinion many years later.
12 Domokos Kosáry,
Napoléon és Magyarország, Budapest 1977, p. 123.
13 Domokos Kosáry,
Napoléon és Magyarország, Budapest 1977, p. 127.
14 Ferenc Bay,
Napóleon Magyarországon, Budapest 1941, p. 32.
(Confusing for many historians are to use the right names of the cities on both sides the Danube. The city on the right
bank is rightly called Uj-Szöny, often written in german Komorn or Neu-Komorn. Today this city is on hungarian
territory and called Komárom. On the left bank of the Danube was actually Komorn on slovakian territory. Today the
town is called Komarnó.
15 Wilhelm Bichmann,
Geschichte des k. u. k. Infanterieregimentes Nr. 62, Vienna 1880, p. 79.
16 Wöber Ferdi Irmfried,
1809 Das Gefecht um Pápa, Vienna, Maria Anzbach 2005, p. 23.
Assignment to the infantry and cavalry was done in a largely arbitrary manner. If one knew something about horses, he
went to the cavalry; all others went to the infantry and a very few to the artillery. The cavalry situation was made worse
by the widespread lack of saddles and tack. Blankets were used instead of saddles. In place of a halter, a rope was used.
17 Csikány Tamás,
A francia és az osztrák tz.rs.g alkalmazása az 1809. évi magyarországi hadjárat során, Scriptum
for his lecture in hungarian language at the „Napoleon Symposium“ from 11 June 2005 in Pápa.
18 Zachar József, Scriptum for his lecture in german language
Die Insurrektion des Königreichs Ungarn, at the
Symposium „Napoleon und Graz“, June 2004 in Graz.
(Archduke John’s military blunder and misinterpretations according to the march through Hungary is well documented
in hungarian history books. First he wanted to march directly to Vienna from the south but did not get any answer from
either Kaiser Franz or Archduke Charles. Not to occupy the hills of Csanak explaines he with the absence of adequately
maps. Just before the battle of Raab he forgot nearly 5.000 soldiers under the command of General Meskó, who had
placed his troops in the southern suburbs of Raab. As the defeat of the hungarian cavalry became evident, he did not send
any support although requested by the hungarian staff. Now followed a devastating critique, what he mentioned to Kaiser
Franz. In a letter to Kaiser Franz Palatine Joseph rejected this critique. Archduke John still wanted - together with the
Insurrection - an attack on the French starting from Komorn but without an allowence of Kaiser Franz. After the end of
the battle of Raab both armies operated separately with their former commanders.)
19 Wöber Ferdi Irmfried,
1809 Die Napoleonische Epoche in Ungarn, Vienna, Maria Anzbach 2008, p. 21, cit. from
Csaba D. Veress,
Napóleon hadai Magyarországon 1809, Budapest 1987, p. 369, and Gyula Viszota, József nádor és az
1809, nemesi felkelés,
published in the magazine Századok (no. 43) p. 631.
19a (A mistake by Archduke Joseph: there were no lancers/uhlans in the Army of Inner Austria).
The retreat of Archduke John did not have any advantage to Archduke Charles in his fight against Napoleon the next
month. His army never arrived in time on the battlefield of Wagram. Beauharnais’ army instead could give Napoleon a
good support.)
20 Varga László,
Tét helytörténete. Napóleon közjaték Téten, Györ 1996, p. 31.
(The village Tét is situated on the mainroad between Pápa and Raab. It was the connecting point for various regiments
of the Insurrection. Discussions about the coming approach began in the house of Pál Noszlopy and became continued
in an inn in the center of the village. Hussar captain Antal Hunkár became vitness of the confrontation. After the
departure of the Palatine all Insurrection regiments left the village. Tét abandoned for the French troops without resistance,
they stayed in the village for two weeks. It was even the detention center for french injured soldiers to be moved on later
to Pápa.)
21 Alois Veltzé,
Von der Ankunft in Körmend bis zur Einrckung und die Cantonirungsstationen nach den Schlachten von
Wagram und Znaim, und der erfolgten Waffenruhe. Vom 1. Juni bis 25. July 1809,
Vienna 1909, p. 73.
22 Schikofszky Károly,
A pozsonyi hidfö védelme 1809-ben, Thesis published in the magazine „ Hadtörténeti
Közlemények“, no. 8. (1895) p. 183, 184 as well as by József Hudi, Scriptum for his lecture in hungarian language
Közigazgatás
és országvédelem 1809-ben,
at the „Napoleon Symposium“ from 11 June 2005 in Pápa.
23 (31 August at 2 o’clock in the afternoon Napoleon arrived in Raab without notice of the town’s authorities. Napoleon
stayed the whole night in the house of family Bezerédj in King’s street 4 (Király utca). In his company were Viceroy
Beauharnais, the Bavarian heir to the throne, the commander of Raab Count Narbonne as well as the Generals Berthier,
Lauriston, Masséna, Rapp, Bertrand, Broussier and Duroi. Soon after his arrival he inspected the fortifications in the
town’s neighbourhood and gave orders in which way they should be maintained. After he agreed to an audience for the
coming morning he took his dinner and wanted to read from 8 o’clock in the evening. His window was closed by a blue
curtain. On the following day the 1 September, he left Raab for Vienna before sunrise without greeting anyone. See
Mihály Paintner,
Diarium calamitatis bellicae, quacum Jaurinum per quinque menses anni 1809, conflictabur.
(handwritten).
24 Kecskés Lászlo,
Komárom az erödök városa. Napóleoni háborúk, Komárom 1984, p. 161.